Appendices - Hirohito's War

   
A. Submarines: America Draws Tight the Noose
December 1941 – August 1945

[Charts: A.1]
Planned Submarine Attack on the Panama Canal,  The Failure of Japanese Submarine Design,  Wasteful Dissipation of Japanese Submarine Force,  Japanese Submarine Cargo Missions to Europe,  Japanese Submarines’ Disappointing ‘Kill’ Performance,  Japan’s ‘Long Lance’ Jockeys,  Newport Torpedo Station,  Rear Admiral Charles Lockwood,  US Submarine Achievements in the Pacific War,  The Failure of Japanese Counter-Submarine Strategy,  The Missed Opportunity 
[Photos]
 
B. Oil, Raw Materials and Logistics: 'Just Start Swinging'
December 1941 to August 1945

[Charts: B.1, B.2 ]
Logistics of Oil in the Asia Pacific War,  America’s T-2 Tanker,  Japan’s Oil Tanker Fleet,  Raw Materials Issues of the US Economy,  Liberty Ships ‘to go’,  Attack Cargo Ships, LSTs and Higgins Boats,  Japan’s Cargo Ship Problems,  Japan’s Air Force Logistics,  US Supply Logistics in the Asia Pacific Region,  Operation Olympic and Japan’s Logistical Denouement 
[Photos]
 
C. Economics of the Pacific War: The 'New Deal' Mobilized
[Charts: C.1, C.2, C.3, C.4, C.5, C.6, C.7, C.8, C.9, C.10, C.11, C.12, C.13, C.14, C.15 ]
Management of the US Wartime Economy,  Guns and Butter,  Inflation and ‘General Max’,  Production Line and Management Systems,  Productivity, Entrepreneurs, Management, Labor, Blacks and Women,  Managing the Scientists,  Expansion of America’s Productive Capacity,  US Aircraft Production,  Tanks, Artillery, Trucks, Ordnance and the Problem of Obsolescence,  Electronics, Radio, and Radar,  Was the Depression a Boon or Hindrance to US War Mobilization?,  Japan’s Wartime Economy,  Conclusion 
[Photos]
 
D. ‘Victory Disease’: The Japanese Empire: From Co-Prosperity to Tyranny
[Charts: D.1, D.2 ]
The Four Phases of Japan’s Imperial Expansion,  The Economics and Philosophy of Japan’s Co-Prosperity Sphere,  Old Empire, Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria,  The Structures of Japan’s New Empire,  Slave Labor in Japan and in the Field,  Cruelty and Suppression,  Prisoners of War,  The Psychology of Brutality,  Unit 731 and the Secrets of Medical Experimentation,  Conclusion, 
[Photos]
 
E. Typhoons and Divine Winds: Kamikaze
[October 1944 to August 1945]

[Charts: E.1 ]
Introduction,  Halsey: After Leyte Gulf,  Kamikaze: Individual Beginnings,  The Formal Adoption of a Kamikaze as a Strategy,  Recruitment, Motivation and Training,  Japanese Government Propaganda,  Developments in Kamikaze Technology and the US Response,  Naval Kamikaze and Yamato’s Suicide Mission,  US Defense Tactics,  Fight to the Death and Operation KETSU (Decisive),  Admiral Ugaki, The Last Kamikaze,  The Cost and Effectiveness of the Kamikaze Campaign,  Kamikaze: A Unique Japanese Phenomenon? 
[Photos]
 
F. American Intelligence in the Pacific War
ULTRA
[Photos]
 
G. Could Japan Have Won the Pacific War?
Introduction ,  Distance, Logistics and Extension of Power ,  Mobilization, Logistics, Isolationism and the Will to Fight ,  Weapons that could have won Japan the War ,  Strategies for Japanese Victory ,  Conclusion  
 
H. Month by Month Timeline of the Pacific War
[December 1941 - August 1945]
 
I. The 'Pacific War': Sundry Tables and Lists
 
J. Pacific War Photographs
 
K. The Battle of Hong Kong
Hong Kong
[Photos]
 
L. The Battles of Attu and Kiska
Attu and Kiska
[Photos]
 
M. Aircraft Carriers in the Pacific War
Summary,  Comparison of Pacific War Aircraft Carriers,  Essex Class Carriers,  US Light Carriers,  Japanese fleet carriers 
[Photos]
 
N. The Role of Oil in the Pacific War
[Charts: N.1, N.2, N.3, N.4, N.5]
Oil’s Early History,  Development of the Oil Industry in the United States,  Royal Dutch Shell,  The Growth of Oil Fired Engines in the Marine Industry,  The Rise of the Automobile,  Tanks and Trucks Transform Battlefield Mobility,  Aviation Gasoline,  Interwar Development of the Aeronautical Industry,  Global Oil Output,  Oil and the Decision for War,  Conclusion  
[Photos]
 
O. Japanese - Soviet Conflict in Siberia, Mongolia and Manchuria
[April 1945–5 September 1945]

[Maps: 39.1, 39.2, 39.3, 39.4, 39.5, 39.6]
Introduction,  Russo-Japanese Relations from the Late Nineteenth Century,  The Trans-Siberian Railway Transforms the Geopolitics of Northeast Asia,  The Battle of Lake Khasan and Amur River Clashes,  The Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact,  The Yalta Conference,  Japanese Preparations for the Defense of Manchuria,  Deployment of Soviet Forces,  Soviet Invasion of Northwest Manchuria from Mongolia,  Invasion of Northeast Manchuria from Far Eastern Siberia,  The Battle of Mutanchiang,  The Battle of Sakhalin Island,  The Occupation of the Kuril Islands  The Significance of the Soviet Invasions 

O. Japanese – Soviet Conflict in Siberia, Mongolia and Manchuria

Soviet Invasion of Northwest Manchuria from Mongolia: On the western borders of Manchuria with Mongolia, the Soviet invasion began with a charge over the barren wastes and gentle hills of the Inner Mongolian plains, toward the Grand Khinghan Mountains 190 miles away, where the Japanese 107th Infantry were garrisoned within elaborate fortifications. as they set off, General Ivan Lyudnikov noted,

“soldiers, tanks and guns passed through the hills hidden in the thick and high grass, again appearing on the slopes. And then the sun rose. Figures of people, military machines, and the contours of the hills opened before us as if on morning maneuvers.”22

On the first day Soviet forces led by the 205th Tank Brigade of the 36th Army under the command of Lieutenant-General A.A. Luchinsky, brushed aside the limited opposition of small Japanese garrisons placed in isolated desert towns. The first sixty-five miles were covered in a single day. The only obstacles were the swamps along the Argun River and the sandy areas toward Khalkin Gol, the scene of Zhukov’s crushing victory against the Japanese at the Battle of Nomonhan [1939]. Luchinsky’s tracked vehicles sped so far ahead of the advancing forces—almost 20 miles at one point—that he was forced to order them to slow down. While the 94th Rifle Corps took the northern route to the Khinghan Mountains, the main body of the 39th Army headed toward the southern reaches.

There were two viable passes through the mountains and the Japanese focused their defenses on these points. When Luchinsky’s forces arrived on 12 August however, the Soviets did not use the Japanese playbook. Instead they forced their way through the mountains, which the Japanese commanders had deemed impassable. The double envelopment left the Japanese 107th Infantry pincered, neither able to advance or retreat. The largest Japanese border force at Qiqihar, where the Japanese Army had developed Unit 516, a chemical warfare defense unit, was duly battered into submission. By 14 August, both Solun and and Wangyeiao, the pillars of the Japanese Fortified region had been captured. a Soviet force, which had underestimated the 50 percent increase in fuel needed to traverse the mountainous passes that their sappers carved through the mountains, thankfully requisitioned the fuel depot at Solun.

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