Appendices - Hirohito's War

   
A. Submarines: America Draws Tight the Noose
December 1941 – August 1945

[Charts: A.1]
Planned Submarine Attack on the Panama CanalThe Failure of Japanese Submarine DesignWasteful Dissipation of Japanese Submarine ForceJapanese Submarine Cargo Missions to EuropeJapanese Submarines’ Disappointing ‘Kill’ PerformanceJapan’s ‘Long Lance’ JockeysNewport Torpedo StationRear Admiral Charles LockwoodUS Submarine Achievements in the Pacific WarThe Failure of Japanese Counter-Submarine StrategyThe Missed Opportunity 
[Photos]
 
B. Oil, Raw Materials and Logistics: 'Just Start Swinging'
December 1941 to August 1945

[Charts: B.1, B.2 ]
Logistics of Oil in the Asia Pacific WarAmerica’s T-2 TankerJapan’s Oil Tanker FleetRaw Materials Issues of the US EconomyLiberty Ships ‘to go’Attack Cargo Ships, LSTs and Higgins BoatsJapan’s Cargo Ship ProblemsJapan’s Air Force LogisticsUS Supply Logistics in the Asia Pacific RegionOperation Olympic and Japan’s Logistical Denouement 
[Photos]
 
C. Economics of the Pacific War: The 'New Deal' Mobilized
[Charts: C.1, C.2, C.3, C.4, C.5, C.6, C.7, C.8, C.9, C.10, C.11, C.12, C.13, C.14, C.15 ]
Management of the US Wartime EconomyGuns and ButterInflation and ‘General Max’Production Line and Management SystemsProductivity, Entrepreneurs, Management, Labor, Blacks and WomenManaging the ScientistsExpansion of America’s Productive CapacityUS Aircraft ProductionTanks, Artillery, Trucks, Ordnance and the Problem of ObsolescenceElectronics, Radio, and RadarWas the Depression a Boon or Hindrance to US War Mobilization?Japan’s Wartime EconomyConclusion 
[Photos]
 
D. ‘Victory Disease’: The Japanese Empire: From Co-Prosperity to Tyranny
[Charts: D.1, D.2 ]
The Four Phases of Japan’s Imperial ExpansionThe Economics and Philosophy of Japan’s Co-Prosperity SphereOld Empire, Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria,  The Structures of Japan’s New Empire,  Slave Labor in Japan and in the FieldCruelty and SuppressionPrisoners of WarThe Psychology of BrutalityUnit 731 and the Secrets of Medical ExperimentationConclusion
[Photos]
 
E. Typhoons and Divine Winds: Kamikaze
[October 1944 to August 1945]

[Charts: E.1 ]
IntroductionHalsey: After Leyte GulfKamikaze: Individual BeginningsThe Formal Adoption of a Kamikaze as a StrategyRecruitment, Motivation and TrainingJapanese Government PropagandaDevelopments in Kamikaze Technology and the US ResponseNaval Kamikaze and Yamato’s Suicide MissionUS Defense TacticsFight to the Death and Operation KETSU (Decisive)Admiral Ugaki, The Last KamikazeThe Cost and Effectiveness of the Kamikaze CampaignKamikaze: A Unique Japanese Phenomenon? 
[Photos]
 
F. American Intelligence in the Pacific War
ULTRA
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G. Could Japan Have Won the Pacific War?
Introduction Distance, Logistics and Extension of Power Mobilization, Logistics, Isolationism and the Will to Fight Weapons that could have won Japan the War Strategies for Japanese Victory Conclusion  
 
H. Month by Month Timeline of the Pacific War
[December 1941 - August 1945]
 
I. The 'Pacific War': Sundry Tables and Lists
 
J. Pacific War Photographs
 
K. The Battle of Hong Kong
Hong Kong
[Photos]
 
L. The Battles of Attu and Kiska
Attu and Kiska
[Photos]
 
M. Aircraft Carriers in the Pacific War
SummaryComparison of Pacific War Aircraft CarriersEssex Class CarriersUS Light CarriersJapanese fleet carriers 
[Photos]
 
N. The Role of Oil in the Pacific War
[Charts: N.1, N.2, N.3, N.4, N.5]
Oil’s Early HistoryDevelopment of the Oil Industry in the United StatesRoyal Dutch ShellThe Growth of Oil Fired Engines in the Marine IndustryThe Rise of the AutomobileTanks and Trucks Transform Battlefield MobilityAviation GasolineInterwar Development of the Aeronautical IndustryGlobal Oil OutputOil and the Decision for WarConclusion  
[Photos]
 
O. Japanese - Soviet Conflict in Siberia, Mongolia and Manchuria
[April 1945–5 September 1945]

[Maps: 39.1, 39.2, 39.3, 39.4, 39.5, 39.6]
IntroductionRusso-Japanese Relations from the Late Nineteenth CenturyThe Trans-Siberian Railway Transforms the Geopolitics of Northeast AsiaThe Battle of Lake Khasan and Amur River ClashesThe Japanese-Soviet Neutrality PactThe Yalta ConferenceJapanese Preparations for the Defense of ManchuriaDeployment of Soviet ForcesSoviet Invasion of Northwest Manchuria from MongoliaInvasion of Northeast Manchuria from Far Eastern SiberiaThe Battle of MutanchiangThe Battle of Sakhalin IslandThe Occupation of the Kuril Islands  The Significance of the Soviet Invasions 


APPENDIX C
ECONOMICS OF THE PACIFIC WAR – THE NEW DEAL MOBILIZED

Japan’s Wartime Economy: Japan’s commercial fleet started to lose 30,000 tons per month within six months of the December 1941 start of the war (360,000 tons annual rate) and 50,000 tons per month by 1943 (600,000 tons annual rate); at these levels losses were unsustainable. If naval and army cargo ships and warships were included however, the alarm bells should have sounded much earlier. In November 1942, Japan lost an aggregate tonnage of 151,000 tons of shipping of all types, which amounted to an annualized figure of 1.8m tons, some 400 percent more than Japanese shipyards had the capacity to produce. Annual net tonnage losses for all shipping was to rise from 233,000 tons in 1942 to 943,000 tons in 1943 and 2.1m tons in 1944.


It would be a mistake to think that, just because the Japanese economy was running at full capacity in 1941, their capacity to produce military goods had peaked. From 1939 to 1944, annual Japanese production of aircraft rose 630 percent from 4,467 units to 28,180 units. Ultimately military production was able to grow because the Japanese government imposed a draconian reduction in living standards on their citizens. By 1945 the calorie intake of the average Japanese citizen had halved over the course of the war and the population was well on its way to starvation. The Japanese economy was also running its stocks of raw materials down to zero. The ‘end of run’ nature of the Japanese military production in 1944 was demonstrated by a complete collapse in production across all sectors in 1945.


In 1941, Japan, the world’s sixth largest economy, with a US$196bn GDP, had already committed itself to a total war economy with China, the fifth largest economy, GDP US$250bn. With its economy running at full capacity and eating into the living standards of its citizens, Japan’s leaders embarked on a strategy to go to war with the US, the world’s largest economy, US$1,100bn and Great Britain, at US$344bn, the fourth largest. In the background was the Soviet Union, perhaps Japan’s most natural enemy, and the world’s third largest economy (US$359bn), with whom Japan had negotiated an uneasy neutrality as recently as 1939 after their defeat by the Soviets at the Battle of Nohoman.


Against this collective economic might of the Allied powers (US$2,053bn), Japan and its allies, Germany (US$412bn), Italy (US$144bn), Austria (US$29bn) and Vichy France (US$130bn), had a collective GDP of US$911bn. The Allies not only had an aggregate GDP more than double that of the Axis but, unlike Germany and Japan, the Allies could coordinate their productive assets. By comparison Japan was effectively blockaded from Germany. As the war continued and the economies of both Germany and Japan degraded, the Allied superiority vis-à-vis the Axis powers grew to 3:1 in 1944 and 5:1 in 1945. Uniquely too, America could finance its militarization at almost no cost to the domestic standard of living. In the course of the war the US government spent US$300bn (in 1944 dollars) with little impact on inflation. In modern day terms the American government’s spend was US$9.6bn over four years at 2007 prices. (To put this in perspective, the US government during the ten years of the Iraq-Afghan Wars 2003 – 2013 is estimated to have spent US$6.0bn at current day prices.)

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