Appendices - Hirohito's War

A. Submarines: America Draws Tight the Noose
December 1941 – August 1945

[Charts: A.1]
Planned Submarine Attack on the Panama CanalThe Failure of Japanese Submarine DesignWasteful Dissipation of Japanese Submarine ForceJapanese Submarine Cargo Missions to EuropeJapanese Submarines’ Disappointing ‘Kill’ PerformanceJapan’s ‘Long Lance’ JockeysNewport Torpedo StationRear Admiral Charles LockwoodUS Submarine Achievements in the Pacific WarThe Failure of Japanese Counter-Submarine StrategyThe Missed Opportunity 
B. Oil, Raw Materials and Logistics: 'Just Start Swinging'
December 1941 to August 1945

[Charts: B.1, B.2 ]
Logistics of Oil in the Asia Pacific WarAmerica’s T-2 TankerJapan’s Oil Tanker FleetRaw Materials Issues of the US EconomyLiberty Ships ‘to go’Attack Cargo Ships, LSTs and Higgins BoatsJapan’s Cargo Ship ProblemsJapan’s Air Force LogisticsUS Supply Logistics in the Asia Pacific RegionOperation Olympic and Japan’s Logistical Denouement 
C. Economics of the Pacific War: The 'New Deal' Mobilized
[Charts: C.1, C.2, C.3, C.4, C.5, C.6, C.7, C.8, C.9, C.10, C.11, C.12, C.13, C.14, C.15 ]
Management of the US Wartime EconomyGuns and ButterInflation and ‘General Max’Production Line and Management SystemsProductivity, Entrepreneurs, Management, Labor, Blacks and WomenManaging the ScientistsExpansion of America’s Productive CapacityUS Aircraft ProductionTanks, Artillery, Trucks, Ordnance and the Problem of ObsolescenceElectronics, Radio, and RadarWas the Depression a Boon or Hindrance to US War Mobilization?Japan’s Wartime EconomyConclusion 
D. ‘Victory Disease’: The Japanese Empire: From Co-Prosperity to Tyranny
[Charts: D.1, D.2 ]
The Four Phases of Japan’s Imperial ExpansionThe Economics and Philosophy of Japan’s Co-Prosperity SphereOld Empire, Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria,  The Structures of Japan’s New Empire,  Slave Labor in Japan and in the FieldCruelty and SuppressionPrisoners of WarThe Psychology of BrutalityUnit 731 and the Secrets of Medical ExperimentationConclusion
E. Typhoons and Divine Winds: Kamikaze
[October 1944 to August 1945]

[Charts: E.1 ]
IntroductionHalsey: After Leyte GulfKamikaze: Individual BeginningsThe Formal Adoption of a Kamikaze as a StrategyRecruitment, Motivation and TrainingJapanese Government PropagandaDevelopments in Kamikaze Technology and the US ResponseNaval Kamikaze and Yamato’s Suicide MissionUS Defense TacticsFight to the Death and Operation KETSU (Decisive)Admiral Ugaki, The Last KamikazeThe Cost and Effectiveness of the Kamikaze CampaignKamikaze: A Unique Japanese Phenomenon? 
F. American Intelligence in the Pacific War
G. Could Japan Have Won the Pacific War?
Introduction Distance, Logistics and Extension of Power Mobilization, Logistics, Isolationism and the Will to Fight Weapons that could have won Japan the War Strategies for Japanese Victory Conclusion  
H. Month by Month Timeline of the Pacific War
[December 1941 - August 1945]
I. The 'Pacific War': Sundry Tables and Lists
J. Pacific War Photographs
K. The Battle of Hong Kong
Hong Kong
L. The Battles of Attu and Kiska
Attu and Kiska
M. Aircraft Carriers in the Pacific War
SummaryComparison of Pacific War Aircraft CarriersEssex Class CarriersUS Light CarriersJapanese fleet carriers 
N. The Role of Oil in the Pacific War
[Charts: N.1, N.2, N.3, N.4, N.5]
Oil’s Early HistoryDevelopment of the Oil Industry in the United StatesRoyal Dutch ShellThe Growth of Oil Fired Engines in the Marine IndustryThe Rise of the AutomobileTanks and Trucks Transform Battlefield MobilityAviation GasolineInterwar Development of the Aeronautical IndustryGlobal Oil OutputOil and the Decision for WarConclusion  
O. Japanese - Soviet Conflict in Siberia, Mongolia and Manchuria
[April 1945–5 September 1945]

[Maps: 39.1, 39.2, 39.3, 39.4, 39.5, 39.6]
IntroductionRusso-Japanese Relations from the Late Nineteenth CenturyThe Trans-Siberian Railway Transforms the Geopolitics of Northeast AsiaThe Battle of Lake Khasan and Amur River ClashesThe Japanese-Soviet Neutrality PactThe Yalta ConferenceJapanese Preparations for the Defense of ManchuriaDeployment of Soviet ForcesSoviet Invasion of Northwest Manchuria from MongoliaInvasion of Northeast Manchuria from Far Eastern SiberiaThe Battle of MutanchiangThe Battle of Sakhalin IslandThe Occupation of the Kuril Islands  The Significance of the Soviet Invasions 


US Supply Logistics in the Pacific War: Although there was fierce competition between the rival US services, the logistics of shipping, unlike Japan, were largely unified. Pre-war planning had originally allocated the ‘sea supply’ function to the Navy; in the review of operational weaknesses after Pearl Harbor it was decided that the Navy did not have the resources for this task. A War Shipping Administration was therefore eventually set up in February 1943 that allocated ships to the Army and Navy on a voyage-by-voyage basis. In the early years of the Pacific War, when supplies to Asia were limited by the ‘Europe First’ strategy, it was a structure that saved a great deal of argument and wasted energy.

But shared logistical management between the Army and Navy had been more theoretical than real in the first years of the war, not helped by a division of command between MacArthur in the southwest Pacific area and Nimitz in the Central Pacific.

The weakness of US logistical infrastructure came to the attention of all parties at the Battle of Guadalcanal where Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner noted that “Eighty percent of my time was given to logistics during the first four months of the ‘WATCHTOWER Operations’ (Guadalcanal)… we were living from one logistics crisis to the next.”30 The Joint Plan for the Support of United States Bases in the South Pacific had only been agreed in July 1942 and was certainly not in effect when Operation WATCHTOWER was launched. In late September 1942, General ‘Hap’ Arnold the head of the US Army Air Corp visited the region and concluded “So far, the Navy had taken one hell of a beating and… was hanging on by a shoestring. They did not have a logistical setup efficient enough to ensure success.”31

Both Japan and the United States had supply line problems to Guadalcanal but those of the US were 50 percent longer. To a large extent the Marines and the Navy were dug out of their hole by General Patch, commander of the Americal Division based on New Caledonia, who supplied them with his reserve stock.

Ultimately the desperate situation of the Marines on Guadalcanal was relieved because both Army, and Navy, the Joint Chiefs and even the President came to realize that losing was not an option. After briefings from ‘Hap’ Arnold and others, Roosevelt put ‘Europe First’ on hold and insisted that the Joint Chief should “…make sure that every possible weapon gets into the area to hold Guadalcanal, and that having held in this crisis, munitions, planes and crews are on the way to take advantage of our success.”32 After Guadalcanal, significant supply bases were built up there and at Espiritu Santo so as to obviate the need for the long lines of supply to Auckland in New Zealand. Further inter-service disputes over supply were finally resolved in a joint directive from Admiral King and General Marshall in Washington entitled Basic Logistical Plan for Command Areas Involving Joint Army and Navy Operations [8 March 1943] It was just as well that these issues were resolved after Guadalcanal because, as the Japanese had discovered, the supply of forward air bases was critical to the advance through the Pacific and more so because the Japanese forces, unlike the US Army at the start of the war, were expertly dug into their island defenses.

As the US forces approached Japan, the logistical requirements changed. Forward air bases were not enough to support the vast scale of the invasion forces needed for Okinawa and the planned Operation Olympic (Kyushu Island). A floating armada was needed and delivered. Apart from the oil tankers, Liberty Ships, C4 troop transports and hospital ships, LSTs, and Higgins Boats already mentioned, American industry supplied repair ships, tugs, mine sweepers, concrete fuel barges, ammunition lighters and even floating bakeries and ice cream makers. Distances added to the volume of logistics required. A force of 40,000 US troops based in Australia had to be serviced by a commercial fleet as large as one serving 100,000 troops based in Great Britain.

The scale of the late war operations in the Pacific conflict exceed anything that has ever been attempted before or since. The 14 June landings on Guam, Saipan and Tinian in 1944 needed an armada of 535 ships carrying 80,000 Marines and 40,000 Army soldiers who had to be carried and supplied from Enowetok Atoll over 1,000 miles distant. The planning for this operation, which took just three months, was carried out in Hawaii, 3,600 miles away. It used so many landing craft that had been diverted from Europe that it caused the postponement of ‘D-Day’ by one month.

MacArthur’s invasion of Leyte Gulf in the Philippines with a force of 150,000 troops was larger than the US component of the D-Day landings in Normandy. The Okinawa invasion, needing 183,000 troops launched and supplied from Ulithi Atoll, required an even larger logistical support.

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