Appendices - Hirohito's War

A. Submarines: America Draws Tight the Noose
December 1941 – August 1945

[Charts: A.1]
Planned Submarine Attack on the Panama CanalThe Failure of Japanese Submarine DesignWasteful Dissipation of Japanese Submarine ForceJapanese Submarine Cargo Missions to EuropeJapanese Submarines’ Disappointing ‘Kill’ PerformanceJapan’s ‘Long Lance’ JockeysNewport Torpedo StationRear Admiral Charles LockwoodUS Submarine Achievements in the Pacific WarThe Failure of Japanese Counter-Submarine StrategyThe Missed Opportunity 
B. Oil, Raw Materials and Logistics: 'Just Start Swinging'
December 1941 to August 1945

[Charts: B.1, B.2 ]
Logistics of Oil in the Asia Pacific WarAmerica’s T-2 TankerJapan’s Oil Tanker FleetRaw Materials Issues of the US EconomyLiberty Ships ‘to go’Attack Cargo Ships, LSTs and Higgins BoatsJapan’s Cargo Ship ProblemsJapan’s Air Force LogisticsUS Supply Logistics in the Asia Pacific RegionOperation Olympic and Japan’s Logistical Denouement 
C. Economics of the Pacific War: The 'New Deal' Mobilized
[Charts: C.1, C.2, C.3, C.4, C.5, C.6, C.7, C.8, C.9, C.10, C.11, C.12, C.13, C.14, C.15 ]
Management of the US Wartime EconomyGuns and ButterInflation and ‘General Max’Production Line and Management SystemsProductivity, Entrepreneurs, Management, Labor, Blacks and WomenManaging the ScientistsExpansion of America’s Productive CapacityUS Aircraft ProductionTanks, Artillery, Trucks, Ordnance and the Problem of ObsolescenceElectronics, Radio, and RadarWas the Depression a Boon or Hindrance to US War Mobilization?Japan’s Wartime EconomyConclusion 
D. ‘Victory Disease’: The Japanese Empire: From Co-Prosperity to Tyranny
[Charts: D.1, D.2 ]
The Four Phases of Japan’s Imperial ExpansionThe Economics and Philosophy of Japan’s Co-Prosperity SphereOld Empire, Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria,  The Structures of Japan’s New Empire,  Slave Labor in Japan and in the FieldCruelty and SuppressionPrisoners of WarThe Psychology of BrutalityUnit 731 and the Secrets of Medical ExperimentationConclusion
E. Typhoons and Divine Winds: Kamikaze
[October 1944 to August 1945]

[Charts: E.1 ]
IntroductionHalsey: After Leyte GulfKamikaze: Individual BeginningsThe Formal Adoption of a Kamikaze as a StrategyRecruitment, Motivation and TrainingJapanese Government PropagandaDevelopments in Kamikaze Technology and the US ResponseNaval Kamikaze and Yamato’s Suicide MissionUS Defense TacticsFight to the Death and Operation KETSU (Decisive)Admiral Ugaki, The Last KamikazeThe Cost and Effectiveness of the Kamikaze CampaignKamikaze: A Unique Japanese Phenomenon? 
F. American Intelligence in the Pacific War
G. Could Japan Have Won the Pacific War?
Introduction Distance, Logistics and Extension of Power Mobilization, Logistics, Isolationism and the Will to Fight Weapons that could have won Japan the War Strategies for Japanese Victory Conclusion  
H. Month by Month Timeline of the Pacific War
[December 1941 - August 1945]
I. The 'Pacific War': Sundry Tables and Lists
J. Pacific War Photographs
K. The Battle of Hong Kong
Hong Kong
L. The Battles of Attu and Kiska
Attu and Kiska
M. Aircraft Carriers in the Pacific War
SummaryComparison of Pacific War Aircraft CarriersEssex Class CarriersUS Light CarriersJapanese fleet carriers 
N. The Role of Oil in the Pacific War
[Charts: N.1, N.2, N.3, N.4, N.5]
Oil’s Early HistoryDevelopment of the Oil Industry in the United StatesRoyal Dutch ShellThe Growth of Oil Fired Engines in the Marine IndustryThe Rise of the AutomobileTanks and Trucks Transform Battlefield MobilityAviation GasolineInterwar Development of the Aeronautical IndustryGlobal Oil OutputOil and the Decision for WarConclusion  
O. Japanese - Soviet Conflict in Siberia, Mongolia and Manchuria
[April 1945–5 September 1945]

[Maps: 39.1, 39.2, 39.3, 39.4, 39.5, 39.6]
IntroductionRusso-Japanese Relations from the Late Nineteenth CenturyThe Trans-Siberian Railway Transforms the Geopolitics of Northeast AsiaThe Battle of Lake Khasan and Amur River ClashesThe Japanese-Soviet Neutrality PactThe Yalta ConferenceJapanese Preparations for the Defense of ManchuriaDeployment of Soviet ForcesSoviet Invasion of Northwest Manchuria from MongoliaInvasion of Northeast Manchuria from Far Eastern SiberiaThe Battle of MutanchiangThe Battle of Sakhalin IslandThe Occupation of the Kuril Islands  The Significance of the Soviet Invasions 

E. Typhoons and Divine Winds: Kamikaze

Kamikaze: Individual Beginnings: Admiral Halsey confided that the Japan’s suicide pilots were the only weapon that he really feared. Kamikaze (literally ‘God Wind’ or normally translated as ‘Divine Wind’) was named after the storms that wrecked the Mongol fleet during its attempt to invade Japan in the thirteenth century. Such was the effect of the kamikaze attacks on the US Navy, that crewmen and pilots, returning to the United States, were instructed to be highly circumspect about what they revealed about the scale of devastation caused by suicide attacks. Kamikaze strikes on the Allied fleets were not simply the occasional sacrifices of a few fanatical pilots. The development of the kamikaze units became a conscious and coherent plan by the Japanese armed forces to turn the tide of the war.

Ad hoc pilot suicides had occurred from the earliest stages of the Pacific War. Even at Pearl Harbor, First-Lieutenant Fusata Iida, who had declared to his colleagues that he would deliberately crash his plane if it became seriously damaged, was believed to have piloted his aircraft into the Kaneohe Naval Air Station after taking a hit. On various occasions, when faced with almost certain death, various US pilots acted similarly. As part of their training exercises, Japanese pilots did ‘suicide dives’ as part of their normal routine. After the war a pilot explained: “It was taken for granted that any pilot with a disabled plane would die in the samurai tradition… He would dive into an enemy ship or plane, taking as many of his adversaries with him as possible.”3 But, suicide attacks appeared to increase as the war turned decisively against Japan.

It soon became clear that Kamikaze attacks were devastating. On 21 October, a Japanese bomber crashed into the upper deck of the HMAS Australia, a heavy cruiser: “I thought we’d been hit by… a bomb or something, I didn’t know what it was at the time…” recalled seaman Reg Walker. “…it crashed …onto the bridge or the compass platform, and down past B turret, and onto the deck, and the foredeck, and then went over the side.”4 Captain Emile Dechaineux “had this hole in his stomach, and he was burnt a little, his lips were rather swollen.”5 Although he was removed to the ship’s medical center, Dechaineux subsequently died. The Australian force commander, Commodore John Collins, was killed outright. Twenty-nine other crewmembers, including many of HMAS Australia’s officers were also killed while sixty-four were wounded. Three days later, during the Battle of Leyte Gulf, a Mitsubishi G4M crashed into the USS Sonoma and sank it.

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