Appendices - Hirohito's War

A. Submarines: America Draws Tight the Noose
December 1941 – August 1945

[Charts: A.1]
Planned Submarine Attack on the Panama CanalThe Failure of Japanese Submarine DesignWasteful Dissipation of Japanese Submarine ForceJapanese Submarine Cargo Missions to EuropeJapanese Submarines’ Disappointing ‘Kill’ PerformanceJapan’s ‘Long Lance’ JockeysNewport Torpedo StationRear Admiral Charles LockwoodUS Submarine Achievements in the Pacific WarThe Failure of Japanese Counter-Submarine StrategyThe Missed Opportunity 
B. Oil, Raw Materials and Logistics: 'Just Start Swinging'
December 1941 to August 1945

[Charts: B.1, B.2 ]
Logistics of Oil in the Asia Pacific WarAmerica’s T-2 TankerJapan’s Oil Tanker FleetRaw Materials Issues of the US EconomyLiberty Ships ‘to go’Attack Cargo Ships, LSTs and Higgins BoatsJapan’s Cargo Ship ProblemsJapan’s Air Force LogisticsUS Supply Logistics in the Asia Pacific RegionOperation Olympic and Japan’s Logistical Denouement 
C. Economics of the Pacific War: The 'New Deal' Mobilized
[Charts: C.1, C.2, C.3, C.4, C.5, C.6, C.7, C.8, C.9, C.10, C.11, C.12, C.13, C.14, C.15 ]
Management of the US Wartime EconomyGuns and ButterInflation and ‘General Max’Production Line and Management SystemsProductivity, Entrepreneurs, Management, Labor, Blacks and WomenManaging the ScientistsExpansion of America’s Productive CapacityUS Aircraft ProductionTanks, Artillery, Trucks, Ordnance and the Problem of ObsolescenceElectronics, Radio, and RadarWas the Depression a Boon or Hindrance to US War Mobilization?Japan’s Wartime EconomyConclusion 
D. ‘Victory Disease’: The Japanese Empire: From Co-Prosperity to Tyranny
[Charts: D.1, D.2 ]
The Four Phases of Japan’s Imperial ExpansionThe Economics and Philosophy of Japan’s Co-Prosperity SphereOld Empire, Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria,  The Structures of Japan’s New Empire,  Slave Labor in Japan and in the FieldCruelty and SuppressionPrisoners of WarThe Psychology of BrutalityUnit 731 and the Secrets of Medical ExperimentationConclusion
E. Typhoons and Divine Winds: Kamikaze
[October 1944 to August 1945]

[Charts: E.1 ]
IntroductionHalsey: After Leyte GulfKamikaze: Individual BeginningsThe Formal Adoption of a Kamikaze as a StrategyRecruitment, Motivation and TrainingJapanese Government PropagandaDevelopments in Kamikaze Technology and the US ResponseNaval Kamikaze and Yamato’s Suicide MissionUS Defense TacticsFight to the Death and Operation KETSU (Decisive)Admiral Ugaki, The Last KamikazeThe Cost and Effectiveness of the Kamikaze CampaignKamikaze: A Unique Japanese Phenomenon? 
F. American Intelligence in the Pacific War
G. Could Japan Have Won the Pacific War?
Introduction Distance, Logistics and Extension of Power Mobilization, Logistics, Isolationism and the Will to Fight Weapons that could have won Japan the War Strategies for Japanese Victory Conclusion  
H. Month by Month Timeline of the Pacific War
[December 1941 - August 1945]
I. The 'Pacific War': Sundry Tables and Lists
J. Pacific War Photographs
K. The Battle of Hong Kong
Hong Kong
L. The Battles of Attu and Kiska
Attu and Kiska
M. Aircraft Carriers in the Pacific War
SummaryComparison of Pacific War Aircraft CarriersEssex Class CarriersUS Light CarriersJapanese fleet carriers 
N. The Role of Oil in the Pacific War
[Charts: N.1, N.2, N.3, N.4, N.5]
Oil’s Early HistoryDevelopment of the Oil Industry in the United StatesRoyal Dutch ShellThe Growth of Oil Fired Engines in the Marine IndustryThe Rise of the AutomobileTanks and Trucks Transform Battlefield MobilityAviation GasolineInterwar Development of the Aeronautical IndustryGlobal Oil OutputOil and the Decision for WarConclusion  
O. Japanese - Soviet Conflict in Siberia, Mongolia and Manchuria
[April 1945–5 September 1945]

[Maps: 39.1, 39.2, 39.3, 39.4, 39.5, 39.6]
IntroductionRusso-Japanese Relations from the Late Nineteenth CenturyThe Trans-Siberian Railway Transforms the Geopolitics of Northeast AsiaThe Battle of Lake Khasan and Amur River ClashesThe Japanese-Soviet Neutrality PactThe Yalta ConferenceJapanese Preparations for the Defense of ManchuriaDeployment of Soviet ForcesSoviet Invasion of Northwest Manchuria from MongoliaInvasion of Northeast Manchuria from Far Eastern SiberiaThe Battle of MutanchiangThe Battle of Sakhalin IslandThe Occupation of the Kuril Islands  The Significance of the Soviet Invasions 


US Submarine Achievements in the Pacific War: Within six months of his taking command of submarine operations in the Pacific War, Lockwood’s forces’ record of performance took a dramatic upward turn. In the first three months of 1943 US submarines sank 57 Japanese merchantmen. By the last quarter of the year the tally had risen to 106, accounting for 65 percent of Japanese merchant ships sunk in that period. In the following quarter, January to March 1944 US submarines sank 136 merchant ships with an aggregate weight of 500,000 tons.

As well as improved torpedoes and operating procedures, Submarine Force, the US Pacific Fleet’s force, was the recipient of an increasing supply of new submarines: the Gato Class and its up-dated successor, the Balao Class. The 312ft by 27.3ft beamed Balao Class with up-rated thick steel and doubled-hull, had more powerful diesel engines and batteries that enabled it to carry out the long range, long duration missions required in the broad reaches of the Pacific Ocean. New submarines delivered increased from 39 in 1942 to 50 the following year and 80 in 1944.

USS Balao would later star as the pink submarine in the Blake Edwards comedy movie Operation Petticoat [1959] with Cary Grant, Tony Curtis and Joan O’Brian, and Pacific submarines would feature in another post-war movie. In June 1945, Lockwood sent nine submarines into the Sea of Japan via the Straits of Tsushima supposedly to test the effectiveness of a new FM sonar in locating minefields. The Operation Barney expedition sank 28 boats (58,000 tons) but USS Bonefish was lost with all hands. It was later questioned whether the operation was justified. Some suspected that it was a revenge mission for Lockwood’s favorite commander ‘Mush’ Morton while others have argued it was a statement of intent to the Russians that the US intended to control the Sea of Japan after the war. However Lockwood may simply have wanted to kill merchant ships and to get across the message to Japanese leaders that nowhere was safe from the US Navy. Operation Barney would later feature as a movie, Hellcats of the Navy [1957] starring future President Ronald Reagan and his wife Nancy Davis (her screen name). It was the only movie they made together.

A record monthly submarine tally of 68 ships was achieved in October 1944, a month in which 130 Japan merchant vessels were lost. Adding to the ravages of submarines, Nimitz’s patrolling fleet task forces in the South China Sea, combined with the Army Air Force now based in the Philippines, were increasingly joining in the wholesale destruction of the Japanese Merchant Fleet. By the first quarter of 1945 US submarine kills on merchantmen, 60 in total, had fallen back to the levels of the first quarter of 1943. Noticeably in this quarter US submarine tallies represented less than 30 percent of Japanese vessels sunk; as the US surface fleet began to surround Japan, it increasingly began to interdict Japanese coastal traffic as well as merchant ships making the short crossing of the Sea of Japan from Korea. The mining of the key straits guarding the Inland Sea and the Kanmon Straits between Kyushu and Honshu, further added to the misery of Japanese marine traffic. In aggregate, in the course of the Pacific War, US submarines sank 4.8m tons of merchant shipping representing 55 percent of their total losses. Having started the war with 6m tons of shipping, and in spite of building 3.25m tons, Japan ended the war with less than 2m tons of which only 312,000 tons was considered to be still serviceable. Unarguably Lockwood’s Submarine Force was the major single contributor to the economic strangulation of Japan.

For the loss of 52 submarines and 348 officers and 3,136 crewmen killed, the US submarine force probably represented the best return on investment of any service in the Pacific War. An aggregate of 1,392 Japanese naval and civilian ships were sunk achieving an average rate of 0.8 kills per submarine patrol. US submarines were perhaps fortunate that Japan was slow to develop destroyer protected convoy systems; as was typical of much of Japan’s planning, defense systems and technology were largely sacrificed to offensive weaponry.

Albeit smaller than their Japanese counterparts, US submarines’ hulls were better designed and more capable of withstanding depth charges. In this respect, they were also helped by the fact that Japanese depth charges carried relatively light charges; Type-95 was standard at the time war broke out, with a 100kg charge of Type-88 explosive, (ammonium perchlorate and ferro silicate). Also, at least in the early part of the war, Japanese depth charges tended to be set too shallow as the Type-95 had just two settings at 100ft and 200ft compared to the standard diving depth achievable by US submarines which was usually 300ft. Lockwood’s Submarine Force was helped by the fact that Japanese destroyers in the pre-war period had largely been designed as fleet attack weapons rather than defensive anti-submarine weapons.

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