Appendices - Hirohito's War

   
A. Submarines: America Draws Tight the Noose
December 1941 – August 1945

[Charts: A.1]
Planned Submarine Attack on the Panama Canal,  The Failure of Japanese Submarine Design,  Wasteful Dissipation of Japanese Submarine Force,  Japanese Submarine Cargo Missions to Europe,  Japanese Submarines’ Disappointing ‘Kill’ Performance,  Japan’s ‘Long Lance’ Jockeys,  Newport Torpedo Station,  Rear Admiral Charles Lockwood,  US Submarine Achievements in the Pacific War,  The Failure of Japanese Counter-Submarine Strategy,  The Missed Opportunity 
[Photos]
 
B. Oil, Raw Materials and Logistics: 'Just Start Swinging'
December 1941 to August 1945

[Charts: B.1, B.2 ]
Logistics of Oil in the Asia Pacific War,  America’s T-2 Tanker,  Japan’s Oil Tanker Fleet,  Raw Materials Issues of the US Economy,  Liberty Ships ‘to go’,  Attack Cargo Ships, LSTs and Higgins Boats,  Japan’s Cargo Ship Problems,  Japan’s Air Force Logistics,  US Supply Logistics in the Asia Pacific Region,  Operation Olympic and Japan’s Logistical Denouement 
[Photos]
 
C. Economics of the Pacific War: The 'New Deal' Mobilized
[Charts: C.1, C.2, C.3, C.4, C.5, C.6, C.7, C.8, C.9, C.10, C.11, C.12, C.13, C.14, C.15 ]
Management of the US Wartime Economy,  Guns and Butter,  Inflation and ‘General Max’,  Production Line and Management Systems,  Productivity, Entrepreneurs, Management, Labor, Blacks and Women,  Managing the Scientists,  Expansion of America’s Productive Capacity,  US Aircraft Production,  Tanks, Artillery, Trucks, Ordnance and the Problem of Obsolescence,  Electronics, Radio, and Radar,  Was the Depression a Boon or Hindrance to US War Mobilization?,  Japan’s Wartime Economy,  Conclusion 
[Photos]
 
D. ‘Victory Disease’: The Japanese Empire: From Co-Prosperity to Tyranny
[Charts: D.1, D.2 ]
The Four Phases of Japan’s Imperial Expansion,  The Economics and Philosophy of Japan’s Co-Prosperity Sphere,  Old Empire, Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria,  The Structures of Japan’s New Empire,  Slave Labor in Japan and in the Field,  Cruelty and Suppression,  Prisoners of War,  The Psychology of Brutality,  Unit 731 and the Secrets of Medical Experimentation,  Conclusion, 
[Photos]
 
E. Typhoons and Divine Winds: Kamikaze
[October 1944 to August 1945]

[Charts: E.1 ]
Introduction,  Halsey: After Leyte Gulf,  Kamikaze: Individual Beginnings,  The Formal Adoption of a Kamikaze as a Strategy,  Recruitment, Motivation and Training,  Japanese Government Propaganda,  Developments in Kamikaze Technology and the US Response,  Naval Kamikaze and Yamato’s Suicide Mission,  US Defense Tactics,  Fight to the Death and Operation KETSU (Decisive),  Admiral Ugaki, The Last Kamikaze,  The Cost and Effectiveness of the Kamikaze Campaign,  Kamikaze: A Unique Japanese Phenomenon? 
[Photos]
 
F. American Intelligence in the Pacific War
ULTRA
[Photos]
 
G. Could Japan Have Won the Pacific War?
Introduction ,  Distance, Logistics and Extension of Power ,  Mobilization, Logistics, Isolationism and the Will to Fight ,  Weapons that could have won Japan the War ,  Strategies for Japanese Victory ,  Conclusion  
 
H. Month by Month Timeline of the Pacific War
[December 1941 - August 1945]
 
I. The 'Pacific War': Sundry Tables and Lists
 
J. Pacific War Photographs
 
K. The Battle of Hong Kong
Hong Kong
[Photos]
 
L. The Battles of Attu and Kiska
Attu and Kiska
[Photos]
 
M. Aircraft Carriers in the Pacific War
Summary,  Comparison of Pacific War Aircraft Carriers,  Essex Class Carriers,  US Light Carriers,  Japanese fleet carriers 
[Photos]
 
N. The Role of Oil in the Pacific War
[Charts: N.1, N.2, N.3, N.4, N.5]
Oil’s Early History,  Development of the Oil Industry in the United States,  Royal Dutch Shell,  The Growth of Oil Fired Engines in the Marine Industry,  The Rise of the Automobile,  Tanks and Trucks Transform Battlefield Mobility,  Aviation Gasoline,  Interwar Development of the Aeronautical Industry,  Global Oil Output,  Oil and the Decision for War,  Conclusion  
[Photos]
 
O. Japanese - Soviet Conflict in Siberia, Mongolia and Manchuria
[April 1945–5 September 1945]

[Maps: 39.1, 39.2, 39.3, 39.4, 39.5, 39.6]
Introduction,  Russo-Japanese Relations from the Late Nineteenth Century,  The Trans-Siberian Railway Transforms the Geopolitics of Northeast Asia,  The Battle of Lake Khasan and Amur River Clashes,  The Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact,  The Yalta Conference,  Japanese Preparations for the Defense of Manchuria,  Deployment of Soviet Forces,  Soviet Invasion of Northwest Manchuria from Mongolia,  Invasion of Northeast Manchuria from Far Eastern Siberia,  The Battle of Mutanchiang,  The Battle of Sakhalin Island,  The Occupation of the Kuril Islands  The Significance of the Soviet Invasions 

APPENDIX N: THE ROLE OF OIL IN THE PACIFIC WAR

Royal Dutch Shell: The founder Marcus Samuel started selling oriental sea-shells from his shop in the East End of London in the 1830s. Shells gave the company its name. Samuel’s sons developed an import and export trading business with machine tools, textiles and rice. After visiting the Black Sea and seeing the potential for oil, the Samuels took their company into oil trading. Starting in 1892 the Samuels revolutionized transportation of oil by hiring tankers to carry oil through the Suez Canal. Five years later 1897 the Samuels changed the company’s name to the Shell Transport and Trading Company.


Around the same time, in 1890, a new company, Royal Dutch Petroleum Company was formed in the Dutch East Asian colony of Sumatra. The company had its origins in the curiosity of Aeilko Jans Zijlker, a plantation manager for East Sumatra Tobacco Company. While visiting a swampy coastal area of Southern Sumatra, Zijlker came across pools of liquid, which, when tested, yielded 60 percent kerosene. With the help of a royal license from the Dutch government his business took off.


Although Zijlker died in the year the company was founded, his successor Jean Baptiste Kessler, oversaw the building of a 6-mile pipeline to a refinery at Balaban River that started production in 1892. In spite of initial funding difficulties production rose dramatically. In the three years from the beginning of 1895, production increased by 500 percent. Even Standard Oil took notice. One executive noted, ‘Every day makes the situation [Royal Dutch Petroleum] more serious and dangerous to handle. If we don’t get control of the situation soon, the Russians, Rothchilds, or some other party may.”3 In spite of stiff completion from Standard Oil, which offered US$40m to buy out Shell, Samuel’s Shell merged with Royal Dutch Petroleum. Thus Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij, a subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell, was established in 1907; ownership was 60 percent Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and 40 percent by the Shell Transport and Trading. To prevent Standard Oil from buying up shares and closing down the company, the directors of the newly merged company created a special preference voting stock that was tightly controlled.


When the US banned the export of high-octane aviation fuels to Japan in 1940, the Japanese government began to put pressure on the Dutch government to increase exports to Japan of 100-octane gasoline, which Royal Dutch Shell had just started to manufacture at its Plaju Refinery in South Sumatra. Shortages of higher-octane fuels and anti-knock additives were already in short supply by 1938 to the extent that the Japanese government lowered the standard for private car gasoline to 74-octane. When Roosevelt’s freeze on Japan’s financial assets led to an oil embargo in July 1941, Shell’s assets in Sumatra and the Dutch East Indies, the nearest major oil resources to Japan, became the default existential target for Japan’s military government.


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