Contents - Hirohito's War

Appendices
Map, Diagram, Drawing and Chart List
Notes and Additional Resources
Acknowledgments
Introduction and Background


PART I    Meiji Restoration: 1868
1 Empires in Conflict
[1868–1931]
[Maps: 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.10, 1.11]
[Photos]
 
PART II    Japan versus America and the World: 1931–1941
2 Ultra-nationalism and the Death of Democracy
[1930–1936]
[Maps: 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4]
[Photos]
3 Japan versus China: From Phoney War to Total War
[1937–1941]
[Maps: 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6]
[Photos]
4 Mobilization for War in Asia: America and Japan
[1931–December 1941]
[Map: 4.1 A] [Chart: 4.1 B] [Map: 4.2] [Chart: 4.3]
[Photos]
 
PART III   Hirohito’s Whirlwind Conquests:
December 1941–June 1942
5 Pearl Harbor: Yamamoto’s Great Mistake
[7 December 1941 in Hawaii and Washington: 8 December 1941 in Tokyo]
[Drawing: 5.1] [Maps: 5.2, 5.3, 5.4]
[Photos]
6 Plan ORANGE and MacArthur’s Philippines Debacle
[December 1941–April 1942]
[Maps: 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 ]
[Photos]
7 Invasion of Malaya: Yamashita’s ‘Bicycle Blitzkrieg’
[December 1941–February 1942]
[Maps: 7.1 A, 7.1 B, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, 7.5]
[Photos]
8 Fall of Singapore: Churchill’s Sacrificial Pawn
[January 1942–February 1942]
[Map: 8.1]
[Photos]
9 Burma Corps: Humiliation Then a Fighting Retreat
[January 1941–May 1942]
[Maps: 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 9.4, 9.5 ]
[Photos]
10 Dutch East Indies and Japan’s Quest for Oil
[December 1941–June 1942]
[Maps: 10.1, 10.3, 10.4, ] [Diagram 10.2 ]
[Photos]
 
PART IV   ‘Victory Disease’: Japan’s Reversal of Fortune:
June–December 1942
11 Limits of Empire: Doolittle and New Military Strategies
[February 1942–May 1942]
[Maps: 11.1 A, 11.1 B, 11.2, 11.3, 11.4, 11.5, 11.6 A, 11.6 B, 11.7]
[Photos]
12 Battle of the Coral Sea: The First Carrier ‘Shoot-Out’
[April 1942–May 1942]
[Maps: 12.1 A, 12.1 B, 12.2]
[Photos]
13 Battle of Midway: Nimitz’s Lucky Day
[4–7 June 1942]
[Maps: 13.1, 13.2, 13.3]
[Photos]
14 Battles of the Kokoda Trail: Aussies Triumphant
[June 1942–September 1942]
[Maps: 14.1, 14.2, 14.3 ]
[Photos]
15 Guadalcanal: Battles of Tulagi, Savo Island, Tenaru and East Solomons
[May 1942–August 1942]
[Maps: 15.1, 15.2 A, 15.2 B, 15.3, 15.4, 15.5, 15.6, 15.7 ]
[Photos]
16 Guadalcanal: Battle of Edson’s (Bloody) Ridge
[August 1942–November 1942]
[Maps: 16.1, 16.2, 16.3]
[Photos]
17 Guadalcanal: Henderson Field and the Santa Cruz Islands
[September 1942–January 1943]
[Maps: 17.1, 17.2, 17.3, 17.4, 17.5]
[Photos]
18 Battles of Buna-Gona-Sanananda: MacArthur’s Lies and Neglect
[November 1942–February 1943]
[Maps: 18.1, 18.2 ]
[Photos]
19 Guadalcanal: Battle of Tassafaronga and Final Reckonings
[October 1942–February 1943]
[Maps: 19.1, 19.2 ]
[Photos]
 
PART V  Toil and Sweat: The Pacific, India, Burma, and China:
January 1943–June 1944
20 Battle of the Bismarck Sea: Tipping Point of US Air Supremacy
[January 1943–March 1943]
[Drawing 20.1]   [Maps: 20.2, 20.3, 20.4, 20.5, 20.6, 20.7]
[Photos]
21 Yamamoto Assassinated and the Battle of New Georgia
[March 1943–October 1943]
[Maps: 21.1, 21.2, 21.3, 21.4 A, 21.4 B, 21.5, 21.6 ]
[Photos]
22 The Huon Peninsula: Operation CARTWHEEL Completed
[September 1943–April 1944]
[Maps: 22.1, 22.2, 22.3, 22.4 ]
[Photos]
23 The Isolation of Rabaul and the Starvation of Bougainville
[November 1943–August 1945]
[Maps: 23.1, 23.2, 23.3, 23.4, ]
[Photos]
24 The Battles of Arakan, Imphal, and Kohima: Slim Boxes Clever
[August 1943–July 1944]
[Maps: 24.1, 24.2, 24.3, 24.4, 24.5, 24.6, 24.7, 24.8 ]
[Photos]
25 The ICHI-GO Campaign and the Battle of Myitkyina
[January 1944–August 1945]
[Maps: 25.1, 25.2, 25.3, 25.4, 25.5, 25.6, 25.7, 25.8, 25.9, 25.10 ]
[Photos]
26 Battle for China: FDR, Chiang, Mao, and ‘Vinegar Joe’
[January 1942–August 1945]
[Charts: 26.1, 26.2 ]
[Photos]
27 Jump to Hollandia: MacArthur’s Greatest Victory
[March 1944–October 1944]
[Maps: 27.1, 27.2, 27.3, 27.4, 27.5, 27.6 ]
[Photos]
28 Pacific Island Hop: The Gilberts, Marshalls, and Carolines
[May 1943–June 1944]
[Maps: 28.1, 28.2, 28.3, 28.4, 28.5, 28.6 ]
[Photos]
 
PART VI   
29 The Great Marianas ‘Turkey Shoot’
[February 1944–June 1944]
[Maps: 29.1, 29.2 ] [Chart: 29.3]
[Photos]
30 The Invasions of Saipan, Tinian, and Guam: General Tojo Upended
[June 1944–August 1945]
[Maps: 30.1, 30.2, 30.3, 30.4, 30.5 ]
[Photos]
31 The Battle of Leyte Gulf: ‘Bull’ Halsey’s Mad Dash for Glory
[October 1944]
[Maps: 31.1, 31.2, 31.3, 31.4, 31.5, 31.6 ]
[Photos]
32 “I Have Returned”: MacArthur Regains the Philippines
[October 1944–August 1945]
[Maps: 32.1, 32.2, 32.3, 32.4, 32.5, 32.6 ]
[Photos]
33 The Battle of the Irrawaddy River: Slim’s ‘Mandalay Feint’
[January 1945–May 1945]
[Maps: 33.1, 33.2 ]
[Photos]
 
PART VII   
34 Iwo Jima: The Iconic Battle of the Pacific War
[February 1945–March 1945]
[Maps: 34.1, 34.2, 34.3 ]
[Photos]
35 The Battle of Okinawa: Slaughter of the Innocents
[April 1945–August 1945]
[Maps: 35.1, 35.2, 35.3 ]
[Photos]
36 LeMay’s B-29 Superfortresses over Japan: Cities in Ashes
[April 1944–August 1945]
[Maps: 36.1, 36.2, 36.3, 36.4 ]
[Photos]
37 Potsdam, Hirohito, and the Atom Bomb
[July 1945–August 1945]
[Drawings: 37.1, 37.2 ] [Maps: 37.3, 37.4 ] [Charts: 37.5, 37.6]
[Photos]

Index

29 The Great Marianas ‘Turkey Shoot’

[February 1944–June 1944]

[Maps: 29.1, 29.2]

The Navy’s Strategic Plan for the Marianas (p 831) Japan Prepares for a Naval Showdown (p 832) The Bombing of the Marianas and Operation A-GO Set in Motion (p 835) Avalanche of New US Navy Matériel (p 838) Advances in Radar, Flight Direction Operation, Computer Driven Anti-Aircraft Gun Systems (p 839) US Superiority in Aeronautics Technology and Combat Tactics (p 843) US Naval Logistics and Operating Practices (p 847) The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot (The Battle of the Philippine Sea) (p 848) The Sinking of the Taiho (p 853) The Last Hurrah of Japan’s Carrier Fleet (p 854) Cuckoos in the Night (p 857) Reflections and Recriminations (p 858)

The Navy’s Strategic Plan for the Marianas: Successes in the Gilberts, Marshalls and Carolines left Nimitz’s forces strung across a long line of islands in the Central Pacific. Thus far the advance toward Japan, as a result of America’s victory in the air in the South Pacific and Central Pacific areas, had been unimpeded by Japan’s Combined Fleet. That pacificity could not be expected to continue as Nimitz embarked on the next stage of his advance toward Japan. From the start of the war the occupation of the Marianas Islands (Saipan, Guam, Rota and Tinian) had been Admiral King’s prime target for Nimitz’s sweep through the Central Pacific. King saw them as the essential location for naval and airfield bases from which an attack could be launched on Formosa and then southern China. From here the Navy would be able to apply the economic strangulation of Japan that King and others believed would force Japan to surrender.

Even within the US Navy, the Marianas strategy did not necessarily carry unanimous support. Vice-Admiral Raymond Spruance had, since his victory at Midway, become, along with Halsey, the Navy’s highest profile combat commander, and preferred to stay silent or neutral on plans of broader strategy. However, his Chief of Staff, Captain Carl Moore, forwarded a strategic paper that advanced the proposal that the capture of Truk and the Marianas was a potentially costly distraction from the strategic priority of getting to the coast of southern China. Turning Japanese logic on its head, Moore argued that the garrison at Truk was a logistical liability rather than an asset to Japan because it would need to be resupplied by sea. Similarly he argued that the Marianas were an unnecessary diversion. Spruance, a close friend of Moore, was happy to give his views a hearing. General Marshall, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was also firmly opposed to the Navy’s Marianas strategy. King and Nimitz agreed with the bypass of Truk but not the Marianas, which they believed were an essential logistical stepping stone to Formosa. However, whereas Admirals King, Nimitz and Spruance saw Formosa as the natural take-off point for the invasion of Japan, Marshall, in line with MacArthur’s wishes, pressed for a military invasion of the Philippines and the use of the northern island of Luzon as the launch pad for the conquest of Japan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did ultimately accept Moore’s logic on the matter of bypassing Truk, but the contentious issue of whether to take the Marianas divided the Army and Navy.

General ‘Hap’ Arnold broke the strategic stalemate. Although the US Army Air Force was a division of the Army and nominally reported to Marshall, Arnold’s long-term plan

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